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CASE COMMENTS
ATTORNEYS-MALPRACTICE-STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS EXTENDED
Family Savings and Loan, Inc. brought an action in May 1969
against Arthur T. Ciccarello, an attorney retained by plaintiff,
charging him with making a negligent title examination in Novem-
ber 1966 of property on which plaintiff had made a loan secured
by a note and a deed of trust. The defendant certified the title as
good and marketable based entirely on a certificate of title pre-
pared by another attorney. The title opinion did not mention a
special use limitation contained in a deed of the subject property
to the purchaser's predecessor in title. This special limitation re-
quired the removal of houses on the property within six months by
the grantee, or the property would revest in the grantor. The pur-
chaser defaulted in July 1968 and in foreclosure proceedings con-
ducted by counsel other than the defendant, this limitation was
discovered. Plaintiff demanded damages as a result of the defen-
dant's negligent title examination, alleging that since the houses
had been removed the security for the loan was worthless.' Defen-
dant claimed that the suit was barred by the statute of limita-
tions.2
The circuit court of Kanawha County affirmed the common
pleas court that had granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment, and the case was appealed to the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals. Held, reversed and remanded. Extending
the discovery rule to promote "justice and right," the court held
that the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiff
discovered the defective title, not when the defective certificate of
title was delivered. Family Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Ciccarello, 207
S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1974).
, The plaintiff made the loan to the purchaser based on both the value of the
lots and the houses subject to the special use limitation. After the loan was made,
the houses were removed in accordance with the limitation, and the purchaser
defaulted and left West Virginia. The plaintiff, therefore, could not look to either
the value of the houses or to the purchaser to recover its loan.
2 The defective certificate of title was delivered to the plaintiff in 1966, but the
action was not commenced until 1969. The defendant contended that the statute
of limitations began to run from the time the certificate of title was delivered in
1966 and that the action was thus barred by the statute of limitatations for actions
in tort. See note 4 infra.
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In order to select the applicable statute of limitations, the
court had to determine from an examination of the pleadings
whether the action was instituted in contract or in tort. Since the
plaintiff used the words "negligently, carelessly, and unskillfully"
in the complaint and did not expressly allege a breach of contract,3
the court decided that the basis of the action was negligence and
that the plaintiff's action was in tort with a one year statute of
limitations.'
In actions for professional malpractice, a majority of jurisdic-
tions have adopted the rule that the statute of limitations begins
to run from the time the negligent act was committed, not from
the date of its discovery.' A minority of jurisdictions, however,
have applied the discovery rule,' particularly in cases where the
3 Recognizing that the statute of limitations could be critical to its case, the
plaintiff, on appeal, attempted to assert an action for breach of contract that carries
a ten year statute of limitations for actions on written contracts. W. VA. CoDE ANN.
§ 55-2-6 (1966). The court determined that although the plaintiff could have origi-
nally instituted an action for breach of contract, the initial complaint was based
on a tort claim of negligence, and an action for breach of contract would not be
allowed. 207 S.E.2d at 160. Since the certificate of title had been delivered more
than three years prior to the commencement of the action, the plaintiff realized that
the only way to avoid the statute of limitations for tort actions was to persuade the
court that the statute of limitations should not begin to run until the plaintiff
discovered the defective certificate of title.
W. VA. Cons ANN. § 55-2-12 (1966) provides:
Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise provided shall
be brought: (a) Within two years next after the right to bring the same
shall have accrued, if it be for damage to property; (b) within two years
next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for
damages for personal injuries; and (c) within one year next after the right
to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for any other matter of such
nature that, in case a party die, it could not have been brought at com-
mon law by or against his personal representative.
Finding that the action was not one for damage to property or for personal injury,
the court determined that subsection (c) contained the appropriate statute of limi-
tation for this action. 207 S.E.2d at 160.
1 207 S.E.2d at 161. See Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 996, 1012 (1966). See also Devel-
opments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 1177, 1200 (1950).
1 The discovery rule evolved from the gradual merger of law and equity. Histor-
ically, equity exercised flexibility in applying limitations to actions as illustrated
by the doctrine of laches, whereas actions at law contained more rigid statutes of
limitations. As a result of the merger some of the flexibility with respect to limita.
tions on actions in equity was extended to actions at law in the form of the discovery
rule that prevented a statutory bar to a cause of action until discovery by the
plaintiff of his right to bring the action. See Developments in the Law, supra note
5, 1213-19; Sherwood v. Sutton, 21 F. Cas. 1303 (No. 12,782) (C.C.D.N.H. 1828).
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negligent act remained hidden and the resulting harm did not
become manifest until long after the act had been committed.7
The discovery rule has also been applied to other situations.
When a surveyor made a negligent survey that resulted in loss of
property to the plaintiff, the cause of action accrued when the
defect in the survey was discovered, not when the survey was
made.8 Similarly when an abstractor's certificate of title failed to
reveal a prior conveyance, the statute of limitations did not begin
to run against the plaintiff's cause of action until this prior convey-
ance was discovered.' The discovery rule has been applied to cases
involving fraud, mistake, or breach of confidence in many jurisdic-
tions. 10
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals first adopted the
discovery rule in connection with subterranean coal mining in
order to protect land owners from encroachments by coal mining
operations." The court held that the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until the land owner discovered the trespass.2 More
recently the West Virginia court has applied the discovery rule to
medical malpractice. In Morgan v. Grace Hospital, Inc. 3 a physi-
cian left a sponge in a patient's abdomen following surgery. The
court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until
the patient learned, or by exercising reasonable diligence should
have learned, of the presence of the sponge."
In actions by a client charging his attorney with negligence,
however, the generally recognized rule has been that the client's
cause of action accrues at the time of the negligent act. 5 As a result
I Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965), applied
the discovery rule in a medical malpractice action when a sponge was left in the
patient's abdomen following surgery. Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex.
1967), held that in an action for negligence against an accountant, the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until the plaintiff suffered legal injury. Chrischilles
v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 150 N.W.2d 94 (1967), applied the discovery rule in an
action against an architect for preparing a negligent design of plaintiff's home. See
also W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88, 253 A.2d 904 (1969).
Hillock v. Idaho Title & Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 126 P. 612 (1912).
10 Developments in the Law, supra note 5, at 1213.
" Petrelli v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 86 W. Va. 607, 104 S.E. 103
(1925).
" Id. at 614, 104 S.E. at 106.
" 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965).
" Id. at 793, 144 S.E.2d at 162.
"E.g., Fort Myers Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261
(D.Cir. 19.67); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 974 (1968).
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of Ciccarello's more inclusive application of the discovery rule,
negligence actions against attorneys in West Virginia are now
treated like negligence actions against other professionals with re-
spect to the statute of limitations. The West Virginia court recog-
nized that in a majority of jurisdictions the discovery rule does not
apply to legal malpractice actions, but expressly refused to equate
this "overwhelming number of cases to the contrary with justice
and right."'"
Courts have used two general approaches to justify applying
the discovery rule. One approach emphasizes the nature of the
negligent act and the circumstances under which it was commit-
ted, concentrating primarily on the defendant's conduct. Decisions
reflecting this view often find fraudulent conduct by the defendant
or look to a breach of confidence as the basis for applying the
discovery rule. The rule is applied punitively to expose or repri-
mand a defendant when his conduct falls below acceptable stan-
dards for his particular profession."7
The other approach emphasizes the effect of the negligent act
on the wronged plaintiff. It concentrates not on the defendant's
conduct but rather on the resulting harm to the plaintiff and the
extent to which the defendant' conduct has put the plaintiff at an
unfair disadvantage. The discovery rule functions in a protective
capacity to diminish the effect of the statutory bar to a cause of
action where justice and right dictate otherwise.
The Ciccarello court rejected the first approach in favor of the
latter approach and looked to when the plaintiff was actually
harmed. The court found that with respect to the running of the
,1 207 S.E.2d at 161. The court, adhering to the rationale of the Morgan deci-
sion, recognized that the modem trend was toward a more liberal application of the
discovery rule. By extending the application of the rule to legal malpractice, the
court adopted the minority view, note 5 supra, stating it to be the better reasoned
rule. Contra, Griffith v. Zavlaris, 215 Cal. App. 2d 826, 30 Cal. Rptr. 617 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963). There a California court refused to apply the discovery rule to legal
malpractice stating that if the time-honored rule to the contrary were to be
changed, it should be changed by the legislature and not by the courts.
17 Cf. Hillock v. Idaho Title & Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 126 P. 612 (1912). The
Idaho court applied the discovery rule in an action against an abstractor for failing
to reveal that property had been previously sold for taxes. Although the plaintiff
did not allege or attempt to prove fraud by the defendant, the court inserted it as
a basis for applying the discovery rule.
I Cf. Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965). The
discovery rule was applied to avoid a harsh and unrealistic result that would have
placed an undue burden on the plaintiff.
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statute of limitations, the plaintiff was harmed when the defective
title was discovered, not when the certificate of title was deliv-
ered."9 Using this approach, the court extended the discovery rule
as applied to medical malpractice cases in Morgan to legal mal-
practice by equating a patient's physical injury resulting from a
physician's negligence to a client's "legal injury" resulting from his
attorney's negligence. Thus, the court used the discovery rule as
the tool to bring legal malpractice within the generally recognized
rule for other forms of common law negligence actions, namely,
that the statute of limitations begins to run when the injury result-
ing from the defendant's negligence occurs.
In deciding when the statute of limitations should begin to
run, many courts examine the facts of each case 21 to determine if
the discovery rule is needed to equalize the relative positions of the
parties. Similarities in fact situations emerge that seem to trigger
the application of the discovery rule in situations where the statute
of limitations would normally begin to run at the time of the negli-
gent act. When the defendant's negligence is inherently unknowa-
ble or could easily escape detection, the running of the statute of
limitations has been delayed pending discovery by the plaintiff.2
This is illustrated in cases where a patient is under anesthesia
during negligently conducted surgery,12 where a mine shaft is ex-
tended silently underground to encroach on a plaintiff's property,2
or where "legalese" obscures a hidden defect in a deed to all but a
skilled attorney.24 Negligence by one in a superior position by vir-
tue of training or education is another factor relevant to the appli-
cation of the discovery rule. This factor has emerged in cases in-
volving physicians, attorneys, and surveyors on whose services the
public must rely to protect their lives and property.2 The payment
of money to obtain a professional service is another important
factor leading to the application of the discovery rule. When fees
are charged in exchange for expert or technical service, a duty
"1 207 S.E.2d at 162.
20 Historically, when the facts of a case disclose mistake, breach of fiduciary
duty, fraud, or undue influence and duress, limitations on actions have often been
held to commence from the time the plaintiff learned of the wrong. Developments
in the Law, supra note 5, 1213-19.
21 Id. at 1203..
22 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965).
"Knight v. Chesapeake Coal Co., 99 W. Va. 261, 128 S.E. 318 (1925).
24 Cf. 207 S.E.2d at 159.
See, e.g., Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959).
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arises to perform the service in a professional, non-negligent man-
ner. 6 When society grants specialized occupations the privilege to
collect fees, a high degree of competency is expected in return.
When certain basic interests are placed in jeopardy by the negli-
gence of another, the "discovery rule" has been more liberally
applied. This factor is relevant in cases where the plaintiff stands
to lose health or property and may be subject to financial or physi-
cal injury if his remedy is barred by a premature application of the
statute of limitations.Y
Although no one factor or combination of factors is present in
every case, when certain of them exist the likelihood that the dis-
covery rule will be applied increases. Faced with a situation con-
taining several of these factors, the Ciccarello court applied the
discovery rule without hesitation. It resolved the question on the
basis of justice to the plaintiff, because a traditional application
of the statute of limitations would deprive the plaintiff of protec-
tion against possible loss of property.
Historically, the courts have freely exercised their discretion
in applying the myriad of statutes of limitations.2 To the extent
this discretion will be utilized in the future remains to be seen, but
the Ciccarello court has made a significant step in exercising it to
promote "justice and right." It has extended greater protection to
the public against negligent conduct by those on whom the public
must rely for the protection of certain basic interests. Finally, the
West Virginia court has taken a step to restore confidence in the
judicial system by diminishing a statutory bar to action that at
times has worked a disadvantage to deserving plaintiffs.
James D. Gray
21 See 207 S.E.2d at 163.
See, e.g., Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 215 A.2d 825 (1966).
21 Developments in the Law, supra note 5, at 1177.
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